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OPENING THE CLOSED DOORS: THE
DUTY OF HOSPITALS TO TREAT
EMERGENCY PATIENTS
JEFFREY E. FINE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The hospital emergency department has become a major compo-
nent in our health care delivery system. Over 70 million Americans
visit hospital emergency departments annually.' The public has
come to view the emergency department as a community health
center, especially in urban areas.' For the most part, hospitals have
responded to the increased demand to provide outpatient care. Un-
deniably, already overburdened emergency rooms are being called
* B.A., Amherst College, 1977; Certificate, Doshisha University, Japan, 1978;
J.D, Washington University, 1982.
1, HR. REP. No. 1089, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6103, 6108. It is estimated that by 1984, emergency room visits
will total 160 million per year. M. MANCINI & A. GALE, EMERGENCY CARE AND THE
LAw 43 (1981).
2. M. MANCINI & A. GALE, supra note 1, at 43-44; J. KNOWLES, HOSPITALS, DOC-
TORS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 25 (1965); AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION,
EMERGENCY SERVICES 6 (1972); Harrigan, Grady Hospital, Haven for the Poor of4t-
lana. Falls Critically Ill Itself. Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 1. Several factors
are involved in the increased use of hospital emergency departments. Population
growth and an overall increase in accidents have contributed to emergency room util-
ization. In addition, physicians have generally abandoned the practice of making
house calls and tend not to be available evenings or on weekends. Furthermore, more
physicians have become affiliated with hospitals and prefer to treat injured or ill pa-
tients at an emergency facility rather than at their offices. Finally, public awareness
has spread that emergency rooms can be appropriate places to seek care. See AMERI-
CAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, EMERGENCY SERVICES 73-74 (1972).
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upon to render aid in non-emergency situations, as well as in life-
threatening emergencies.' Yet it is a disturbing fact that hospitals oc-
casionally deny treatment to persons who require immediate medical
attention.
The standards of the medical profession,5 as well as the general
consensus of public sentiment, are offended by a hospital's refusal of
emergency treatment to those who need it.6 The American College
of Surgeons has released the following official statement:
The function of an emergency department is to give adequate
appraisal and initial treatment or advice to any person who con-
siders himself acutely ill or injured and presents himself at the
emergency department door.7
The American Hospital Association has urged that "no patient with a
complaint serious enough to bring him to the emergency department
of the hospital should be denied appropriate examination and dispo-
3. S. KLAW, THE GREAT AMERICAN MEDICINE SHOW 54-57 (1976); J. SPENCER,
THE HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT 1-21 (1972); Letourneau, Legal,4spects of
the Hospital Emergency Room, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 50, 56-57 (1967).
4. Signor, Shiftedfrom Hospital with Knfe in His Back, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Oct. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 4; Vaughn, Ejectedfrom Barnes with Knife in his Back, Suesfor
$1,000,000, St. Louis Am., Mar. 5, 1981, at 1, col. 2. These articles describe the treat-
ment Barnes Hospital rendered to a knife-wound victim on October 13, 1980. The
victim arrived at Barnes by city ambulance with a knife imbedded in his back. Emer-
gency room residents checked his vital signs and took x-rays. The victim's stepfather
related to admitting personnel that the victim had no insurance. Hospital personnel
advised that the victim be transferred to City Hospital, where treatment would be
free. Consequently, two hours after arrival at Barnes, the victim was transferred with
the knife still in his back. An operation was performed at City Hospital, but the
victim claims that the transfer aggravated his condition. He has sued Barnes for neg-
ligence. More than two years after the incident, the matter is still in the pre-trial
discovery stage. Little v. Barnes Hospital, No. 812-1047 (St. Louis Cir. Ct., filed Feb.
26, 1981). See cases cited infra notes 21-72 and accompanying text. See also E. Ki3N-
NEDY, IN CRITICAL CONDITION: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 80-88
(1972).
5. The American Medical Association Principles of Medical Ethics state, at § 5:
A physician may choose whom he will serve. In an emergency, however, he should
render care to the best of his ability. Having undertaken the care of a patient, he
may not neglect him; and unless he has been discharged he may discontinue his
services only after giving adequate notice. (emphasis added)
Principles of Medical Ethics, reprinted in T. BEAUCHAMP, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 283 (1979).
6. Powers, Hospital Emergency Service and the Open Door, 66 MICH. L. REV.
1455, 1475 (1968).
7. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT-A HAND-
BOOK FOR THE MEDICAL STAFF 129-30 (1966).
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sition by a physician."8 Despite these pronouncements, persons in
need of emergency care are not always afforded access to such care.
This Note examines the case law that has addressed a hospital's
duty to treat emergency patients. It then surveys the nature and
scope of duties imposed by state statutes. Finally, rationales are ad-
vanced to support the thesis that a hospital that operates an emer-
gency room has a duty to treat all persons requiring emergency care.
II. THE COMMON LAW
The common law distinction between misfeasance and nonfea-
sance has shaped the law regarding a hospital's duty to provide emer-
gency medical care. In tort law, courts have imposed liability for
intentional or negligent misfeasance but not for failure to act, or non-
feasance.9 Hence, failure to render aid to one in peril was not
grounds for liability since there was no duty to act. 10 The most com-
monly cited justification for not imposing affirmative duties was the
individualistic philosophy upon which the common law was based."
Judges restrained the commission of affirmative acts that caused
harm, but were reluctant to restrict an individual's freedom by com-
pelling him to come to the aid of another.
Regardless of the explanations, it is clear that the law was slow to
recognize liability for nonfeasance. Gradually, however, courts have
created exceptions to the general rule. The first exception concerned
those who have a special relationship with the person in peril. 2
Courts imposed duties to aid and protect on common carriers, inn-
keepers, employers and shopkeepers."' These classes of persons have
undertaken a duty to give service, and the expected economic benefit
8. J. SPENCER, THE HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT 1 (1972). See also
JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR
HOSPITALS, reprinted in M. BERTOLET & L. GOLDSMITH, HOSPITAL LIABILITY, LAW
AND TACTICS 327, 351 (1980).
9. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON TORTS 338-39 (4th ed. 1971).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT].
11. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 339. Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination and
Nonfeasance, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 196, 214 (1946). Prosser also suggests that common
law courts were too busy adjudicating cases of misfeasance to be concerned with indi-
viduals who merely failed to act, although serious harm may have resulted. W. PROS-
SER, supra note 9, at 338.
12. Id at 339.
13. Id at 341-42; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §§ 314A, 314B.
19831
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justifies the imposition of an affirmative duty.14
Courts and commentators have recognized a second exception
when an individual's own conduct has placed another peril.' 5 Even
those who innocently cause harm to another are required to aid those
who have been injured.' 6 Since the actor's conduct created the harm,
or the possibility of harm, an obligation arose to assist in the mitiga-
tion of that harm.
The common law recognized another exception to the general rule
when the defendant voluntarily rendered aid and a person relied to
his detriment upon the gratuitous undertaking."7 In a famous exam-
ple,'" a railroad that voluntarily employed a signalman at a street
crossing was required to perform that function with due care. Liabil-
ity could be incurred for failing to perform the undertaking when
performance was to be expected.' 9 Once an individual has begun
rendering assistance to another, reasonable care must be exercised.20
The general rule and its exceptions provide the analytical frame-
work for analyzing disputes between persons seeking emergency
medical care and hospitals maintaining emergency departments.
III. THE EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT CASES
A. Traditional Rule
Based on the general rule, courts have been reluctant to impose a
duty upon hospitals to accept all patients who seek admission.2 ' Sim-
ilarly, courts do not require physicians to treat every applicant who
requires service.22 Like the competent swimmer who may watch a
14. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 339.
15. Id at 342-43; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 322.
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 342-43; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 322.
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 346; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 323.
18. Erie R.R. v. Stewart, 40 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 843 (1930).
19. Id at 857.
20. Id This exception also encompasses the situation where one takes charge of
another who is helpless and discontinues aid in a manner that aggravates the other's
condition. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 324.
21. E.g., Hill v. Ohio County, 468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1971) (public hospital had no
duty to admit pregnant woman who was about to give birth), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1041 (1972); Le Jeune Rd. Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965) (private hospital may reject any patient that it does not desire).
22. E.g., Childs v. Weiss, 440 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (absent a contrac-
tual obligation, a physician is under no duty to render services to those who request
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol24/iss1/5
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child drown, physicians and hospitals are under no legal duty to res-
cue, although their professional codes of ethics provide otherwise.2 3
The earliest case addressing the duty of a hospital to render emer-
gency treatment is Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Crews. 4 The par-
ents of a child stricken with diphtheria took the child to the
defendant hospital. The house physician examined the child and ad-
ministered oxygen and antitoxin. The hospital refused to admit the
child, however, because the hospital's policies prohibited the admis-
sion of patients with contagious diseases. The child died within
fifteen minutes after returning home. In a subsequent wrongful
death action, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed a verdict for the
plaintiff, holding that the hospital was a private corporation that
owed no duty to the plaintiff.2 5 The court also rejected the conten-
tion that the hospital had undertaken to render ordinary hospital
services by providing emergency care. The provision of such care did
not create a duty to hospitalize the patient because emergency aid in
a "desperate" situation was appropriate conduct.2 6
Although many courts27 cite Crews as authority for the general
rule that a private hospital has no duty to treat an emergency patient,
the Alabama Supreme Court was satisfied that the hospital provided
appropriate emergency care. The case more accurately held that a
hospital has no duty to admit a patient after it has provided emer-
gency care. It strains credulity, however, to suggest that when the
child left the hospital, the emergency had abated." The hospital pro-
vided some treatment, but it abandoned that care before the patient's
condition had stabilized. The imposition of liability would be fully
them), Buttersworth v. Swint, 53 Ga. App. 602, 186 S.E. 770 (1936) (physician is not
obligated to treat every individual who applies to him).
23. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See also T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note
5, at 135-45.
24. 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934).
25 Id at 399, 157 So. at 225.
26. Id at 400, 157 So. at 225.
27. Eg., Fjerstad v. Knutson, 271 N.W.2d 8, 11 (S.D. 1978); Le Jeune Rd. Hosp.,
Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
28. The attending physicians treated the child during the entire time she was in
the emergency room. The child's condition showed some signs of improvement and
the progress no doubt resulted from the treatment rendered. But the physicians dis-
continued the treatment abruptly, before full recovery. The doctors agreed that the
child should avoid exertion and should be at rest, yet they dismissed her nonetheless.
229 Ala. at 400, 157 So. at 226.
1983]
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consistent with the exception to the general rule that one who under-
takes to aid another in peril must do so with reasonable care.29
Many courts have followed the broad reading of Crews. In Hill V.
Ohio County,30 a public county hospital refused to admit a woman
who thought she was in labor. Consequently, the child was born at
home without medical attention and the woman died shortly after
giving birth. The court simply stated that an emergency did not ex-
ist3 and that the hospital had breached no duty.32 The case is signifi-
cant because the Crews court expressly addressed the obligations of a
private hospital.33 The hospital in Hill, on the other hand, was
owned and operated by the county. The court found no duty by ex-
tending Crews beyond its facts.
The Alabama Supreme Court reaffirmed Crews in Harper v. Baptist
Medical Center-Princeton." The plaintiff, an accident victim, was
taken by ambulance to the emergency room of a private hospital.
The hospital treated the victim but refused to admit him for surgery
because he lacked insurance. Four hours after arrival, the plaintiff
was transferred to a charitable hospital where he underwent surgery.
The plaintiff alleged that his permanent foot drop condition resulted
from the delay in treatment. The court affirmed a directed verdict for
the defendant, because the hospital was under no duty to admit the
patient after having stabilized him.35 Furthermore, the plaintiff failed
to sustain his burden of proof that the delay in surgery, rather than
the initial injury, had caused the permanent condition.36
None of these cases addresses the question of whether the hospital,
private or public, had a duty to provide emergency treatment. The
Alabama courts seem to have assumed that the undertaking of some
care was appropriate under the circumstances.37 The provision of
29. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
30. 468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 (1972).
31. Id at 309. For an excellent article discussing the medical complications of
childbirth, see Dallek, Labor and Delivery as a Medical Emergency, 10 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 947 (1977).
32. 468 S.W.2d at 309.
33. Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 399, 157 So. 224, 225
(1934).
34. 341 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 1976).
35. Id at 134-35.
36. Id at 135.
37. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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some emergency care, however, did not create the duty to provide
additional medical treatment.
B. Implied Admissions
Many courts have circumvented the general rule by finding that
the hospital, by initiating some treatment or care, admitted the pa-
tient. 38 These courts are quick to find the formation of a hospital-
patient relationship, with a resulting duty of due care. Illustrative of
this line of cases is Methodist Hospital v. Ball.39 In Ball, a city ambu-
lance transported a young accident victim to the emergency room of
a private hospital. The intern checked the victim's vital signs and
abdomen, but was preoccupied with other patients whom he thought
were in more critical condition. The victim was left on a stretcher in
a corridor for forty-five minutes before transfer to another hospital.
He died soon after the transfer.
In a wrongful death action, the court found for the plaintiff, re-
jecting the hospital's argument that the victim had never been admit-
ted to the hospital. The court simply concluded that the victim had
been admitted.4" The court gave no guidelines, however, as to what
action results in admission to a hospital.
A similar result ensued in New Biloxi Hospital, Inc. v. Frazier."
While suffering from a gunshot wound and bleeding profusely, Fra-
zier was taken to the emergency room. The hospital staff there virtu-
ally ignored him. After twenty minutes, a nurse checked his pulse
and blood pressure but did nothing to stop the bleeding. The physi-
cian on call arrived thirty minutes later and conducted a cursory ex-
amination. Upon discovering that the victim was a veteran, the
physician arranged for his transfer to a veteran's hospital. Frazier
expired shortly after the transfer. The Mississippi Supreme Court
concluded that a hospital-physician relationship existed, since Fra-
zier had been recorded as a patient and spent two hours in the emer-
gency room.42 Under these circumstances, the court held that the
38. Eg., Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1957) (brief clinical ex-
amination sufficient to create hospital-patient relationship); O'Neill v. Montefiore
Hosp., I 1 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960) (jury could find that nurse's telephone
call to physician established physician-patient relationship).
39, 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362 S.W.2d 475 (1961).
40. Id at 469, 362 S.W.2d at 479.
41. 245 Miss. 185, 146 So. 2d 882 (1962).
42 Id at 197-98, 146 So. 2d at 887.
1983]
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hospital breached its duty to use reasonable care in protecting Fra-
zier's life.
While the results of these decisions may be laudable, their impact
on the law has not been positive. The courts failed to clarify how and
when patient status begins. It is not surprising, then, that courts have
struggled with the question of determining what criteria lead to ad-
mission.43 As one court ruled, that question must vary with the cir-
cumstances. 44 Even the slightest undertaking may give rise to a
hospital-patient relationship. 45 Although motivated by humanitarian
ends, courts that seize on any pretext to support creation of patient
status may produce unwanted results. Rather than running the risk
of creating a hospital-patient relationship, the hospital may refuse to
undertake any action at all. A hospital that flatly refuses to allow an
applicant through its doors could thus escape liability, while another
that provides minimal emergency care could be made subject to
liability.46
The decisions are equally unsatisfying because of their misreading
of Crews. The opinions cite dicta in Crews, which states that a hospi-
tal may reject any applicant for medical and hospital services. Crews,
however, held that a hospital need not admit a patient after it has
provided some degree of emergency care.47 Unfortunately, courts
emphasize the broad dicta of Crews rather than its specific holding.
In order to overcome the "settled rule" that a hospital was under no
43. See cases cited supra note 38 and accompanying text.
44. Le Jeune Rd. Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202, 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965).
45. The most glaring example of this line of cases is O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp.,
11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960). The plaintiff's decedent, suspecting that he
had suffered a heart attack, walked to the defendant hospital. The emergency room
nurse refused to treat him because the hospital did not accept his insurance coverage.
Instead, she telephoned a doctor participating in the victim's insurance plan. The
doctor conversed with the victim and apparently suggested that the victim seek treat-
ment at a clinic that honored the insurance plan. After hanging up, the decedent
again requested treatment and the nurse again refused. The decedent expired soon
after returning home.
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs claim against the hospital. The appellate court
reversed and remanded for a jury determination of whether, by her conduct, the nurse
had undertaken to render aid to the decedent. Rather than sending the case to a jury,
the hospital chose to settle by paying $45,000. For criticism of the decision, see Note,
Liability of Private Hospital Emergency Roomsfor Re/usal to Provide Emergency Care,
45 Miss. L.J. 1003, 1009 (1974).
46. Note, supra note 45, at 10 12-13.
47. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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obligation to treat even an emergency patient, the courts created
fictional admissions that could produce equally arbitrary behavior on
the part of hospitals.48
C. Reliance On a Well Established Custom
In Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove,4 9 the Delaware
Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in the field of emergency
hospital care. The plaintiffs infant child was stricken with diarrhea
and a high fever. The family physician prescribed medicine and
treatment, but after four days the child showed no signs of improve-
ment. Knowing that their family physician was not in his office,5" the
Manloves took the child to the emergency room of defendant hospi-
tal. At the hospital the parents related the nature of the child's illness
and treatment. The nurse on duty explained that there was a danger
of conflicting medication, since the child was under the care of a phy-
sician. Thus, the child could not be treated. The nurse neither ex-
amined the child nor rendered any affirmative medical aid. She did
attempt unsuccessfully to contact the plaintiffs family physician and
recommended that the child be taken to the hospital's pediatric clinic
the next day.5 At home that same afternoon, the child died of
bronchial pneumonia.
Alleging negligence in the hospital's refusal to render emergency
assistance, the parents filed a wrongful death action against the hos-
pital. The Delaware court did not approach the case on the basis of
whether or not the child was a patient. Instead, the court squarely
focused on whether the hospital had a duty to treat an emergency
case, "one obviously demanding immediate attention. ' 52 The court
conceded that a private hospital has no duty to maintain an emer-
gency ward. The maintenance of such wards, however, had become a
well established component of a hospital's services. The court con-
strued the voluntary maintenance of an emergency ward as a gratui-
tous undertaking to render medical care. The denial of that care to a
48. Note, supra note 45, at 1013.
49. 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961).
50. Id. at 16, 174 A.2d at 136. It was a Wednesday morning. Id. See generally E.
KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 15.
51. Although debatable, it is unlikely that these actions would have either consti-
tuted an undertaking to render assistance or conduct sufficient to create a hospital-
physician relationship. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
52. 54 Del. at 22, 174 A.2d at 139.
19831
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person relying on the hospital's custom was tantamount to the "negli-
gent termination of gratuitous services, which creates a tort liabil-
ity."53 The court held that liability could result for failure to treat an
individual in an unmistakable emergency, if that individual had re-
lied upon the well established custom of a hospital to render aid. 54
The Manlove rule expands the voluntary undertaking concept be-
yond that of the other cases.5 Although still confined by the com-
mon law attitude toward nonfeasance, the Delaware court created a
rule that could be applied with greater certainty. While other courts
had gone to great extremes to locate conduct sufficient to establish a
hospital-patient relationship,56 under Manlove the plaintiff need only
prove reliance on a custom of treating emergency cases.5 7
The Georgia Court of Appeals embraced Manlove in Williams v.
HospitalAuthority of Hall County.58 The plaintiff arrived at a county
hospital suffering from a traumatic injury, which visibly caused him
great pain. The defendant hospital refused to treat him and con-
tended in court that it had the absolute right to refuse emergency
treatment. The judge stressed that the hospital was supported by
public funds and maintained an emergency ward. He rejected as "re-
pugnant" the argument that the hospital could refuse to render emer-
gency care when emergency facilities were available. 9 While
carefully limiting the opinion to the duty of public hospitals, the
court held that a public hospital may not deny emergency care to an
individual who sought aid from an institution that held itself out as
providing such care.6"
53. Id at 23, 174 A.2d at 139. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 323. See also
supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
54. 54 Del. at 25, 174 A.2d at 140. The case is discussed in Note, Duty ofPrivate
Hospital Maintaining Emergency Ward to Treat in Case of Unmistakable Emergency,
40 TEX. L. REv. 732 (1962); 62 COLUM. L. REV. 730 (1962); 14 STAN. L. Rav. 910
(1962). See generally Note, Must a Private Hospital Be a GoodSamaritan?, 18 U. FLA.
L. REv. 475 (1965); Powers, supra note 6.
55. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
56. Id
57. Commentators suggest that the Manlove court did not clearly define what it
meant by "reliance on a well established custom." Powers, supra note 6, at 1474-75;
Note, supra note 45, at 1016. Nevertheless, proof of knowledge that an emergency
room existed and had a practice of rendering aid is a clearer formulation than the
implied admission rationale. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
58. 119 Ga. App. 626, 168 S.E.2d 336 (1969).
59. Id at 627, 168 S.E.2d at 337.
60. Id
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The Missouri Supreme Court applied the same rationale to a pri-
vate hospital in Stanturf v. Sipes.6 The plaintiff there was suffering
from frostbite. The physician who examined him determined that
the patient needed emergency hospital treatment. The physician
tried to arrange for the plaintiff's admission to the nearest hospital,
which was private. Admission was contingent on the payment of a
twenty-five dollar fee, which plaintiff could not afford. Although
other individuals were willing to pay the fee in the plaintiffs behalf,6"
treatment was refused. After several days of futile effort, the plaintiff
was finally admitted to an out-of-state hospital. When therapy treat-
ments proved unsuccessful, both his feet were amputated.
In a suit against the hospital, the plaintiff alleged that the hospital's
refusal to treat him had aggravated his condition and was actionable.
Concluding that a jury could find that the plaintiff or his physician
had relied on the hospital's practice of treating emergencies, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment for the hospi-
tal. 3 When viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, it was also possible to find that the plaintiffs condition con-
stituted an unmistakable emergency and that delay in treatment had
worsened the condition.64
Courts in many jurisdictions have applied the Manlove rule to both
public and private hospitals.65 Some courts have rejected Manlove
by following dicta in Crews indicating that a hospital which main-
61. 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969).
62. Although the facts are unclear, the court's opinion recites that a local church
group had expressed its willingness to pay the admission fee. Nevertheless, the hospi-
tal administrator declined the church group's assistance, perhaps because of a policy
against admitting charity patients. Id at 559.
63. Id at 562.
64. Id
65. E.g., Carr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 384 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Ark.
1974) (jury could properly decide that public hospital had breached its duty to plain-
tifi's decedent who had relied on hospital's practice of treating emergency patients);
Guerro v. Copper Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975) (private general
hospital may not refuse emergency treatment without cause); Hunt v. Palm Springs
Gen. Hosp., 352 So. 2d 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (questions of whether emer-
gency condition existed and breach of duty occurred were properly before the jury);
Richard v. Adair Hosp. Found. Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1978) (jury should decide
question of whether or not hospital was negligent for refusing to treat decedent who
was stricken with pneumonia); Mercy Medical Center v. Winnebago County, 58 Wis.
2d 260, 206 N.W.2d 198 (1973) (private hospital maintaining emergency ward has
duty to treat emergency patients who rely on hospital's holding itself out as providing
such care).
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tains an emergency department may refuse to treat an individual in
need of immediate attention . 6 As noted earlier, this is an erroneous
reading of Crews. Crews held simply that a hospital need not admit a
patient after providng emergency room treatment.67 Other courts
have avoided Manlove by finding that the hospital had no duty to
render service, because the patient's condition did not constitute an
emergency.6 8 Another court found Manlove inapposite when the
plaintiff could not prove reliance on the hospital's policy of rendering
emergency care.
69
The commentators agree that Manlove represents the developing
trend regarding a hospital's duty to treat emergency patients.70 It is
not, however, the universal position.71  Furthermore, Manlove has
not disturbed the principle that a hospital that treats an emergency
patient is under no obligation to hospitalize that individual. Trans-
fers to other hospitals are permissible as long as the diagnosis is not
negligent and the transfer does not aggravate the patient's condi-
tion.7.2 Nevertheless, Manlove represents a judicial landmark in im-
posing a duty on hospitals to treat unmistakable emergency cases
when the applicant has relied on the hospital's custom of rendering
66. Eg., Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946) (in absence of
statutory duty, private hospital has no obligation to serve every applicant who applies
for treatment); Fjerstad v. Knutson, 271 N.W.2d 8 (S.D. 1978) (even hospital that
operates emergency department may refuse to render emergency treatment). See
supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Campbell v. Mincey, 413 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Miss. 1975) (pregnant
woman who sought treatment at county hospital so she could deliver child did not
constitute an emergency case). See also supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
69. Fabian v. Matzko, 236 Pa. Super. 267, 344 A.2d 569 (1975) (plaintiff, who
merely telephoned hospital and conversed with staff physician, but did not visit the
hospital, did not rely to his detriment on hospital's practice of treating patients).
70. M. MANCINI & A. GALE, supra note 1, at 50; A. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF
HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 187-88 (1978); UNIVERSITY OF
PITTSBURGH HEALTH LAW CENTER, HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, 31 (1980); D. WAR-
REN, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 88-89 (3d edJ 1978); Ficarra, The Hosital Eme -
gency Room and the Law, 12 CAL. W.L. REV. 223, 236 (1976); Note, supra note 45, at
1020.
71. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
72. E.g., Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934);
Harper v. Baptist Medical Center-Princeton, 341 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 1976); Joyner v.
Alton Ochsner Medical Found., 230 So. 2d 913 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (after affording
plaintiff initial emergency treatment, hospital could properly transfer him rather than
hospitalize him for additional treatment).
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aid.7 3
IV. STATUTORY DUTIES
Coincident with these developments in judicially created law,
many states have enacted statutes governing the duties of hospital
emergency departments. The scope and requirements of the statutes
vary from state to state. A few states require hospitals to have at least
one licensed doctor or intern on duty at all times.74 Other states have
imposed more stringent requirements. Wisconsin, for example, has
enacted a statute requiring that public hospitals in counties with
populations of more than 250,000 persons establish and maintain
emergency departments. 5 The statute imposes a duty to treat "per-
sons in said county who may meet with accidents or suddenly be af-
flicted with illness not contagious. ' ,76  The statute permits the
removal of the patient to another hospital when transfer may be
safely achieved. Thus, the Wisconsin statute does not require hospi-
talization of all emergency patients.77
Like the Wisconsin provision, the Texas statute applies only to
public hospitals.71 It imposes a duty on staff members at hospitals
supported with public funds to treat all applicants who are seriously
ill or injured, provided the hospital customarily provides such treat-
ment.79 The statute is a codification of the Manlove rule, but is re-
stricted to public hospitals.
California, Florida and Wyoming have adopted nearly identical
legislation." Their statutes apply to all hospitals that maintain and
operate emergency departments, whether public or private. Appli-
cants who are in danger of loss of life or in serious condition,81 or
whose condition will deteriorate from failure to receive treatment,82
73. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
74. Eg., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 435 (Purdon 1977); VA. CODE § 32.1-127 (1979).
75. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.21(8)(b) (West 1979).
76. Id
77. Id
78. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN., § 4438a (Vernon 1976).
79. Id
80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (Deering 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 401.45 (West 1973); Wyo. STAT. § 35-2-115(a) (1977).
81. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (Deering 1975).
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 401.45 (West 1973).
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must be afforded emergency care. The California statute further
mandates that hospitals lacking emergency facilities must use reason-
able care to facilitate the applicant's access to emergency treatment,
including transportation assistance.
83
In 1969, New York enacted a law requiring every general hospital
to admit any person in need of immediate hospitalization.84 The
statute also provides that hospitals maintaining emergency depart-
ments must furnish emergency medical care to any applicant who
requires such care.85 The statute thus differentiates between hospital-
ization and emergency treatment, but imposes both obligations in ap-
propriate circumstances. In 1973 the legislature added a section
obligating every hospital in metropolitan areas with over one million
inhabitants to provide emergency care to persons in need of such
care.
86
The Illinois and Tennessee enactments are the broadest in scope.
The Illinois act provides that every licensed hospital in the state that
provides general medical and surgical services must maintain an
emergency department and must furnish such services "to any appli-
cant who applies for the same in case of injury or acute medical con-
dition where the same is liable to cause death or severe injury or
serious illness." 87 The Tennessee act applies to "every hospital,
either public or private, which does business within this state and
provides general medical and surgical services." 88 Such hospitals are
required to operate emergency departments and may not deny treat-
ment to applicants whose conditions are liable to result in death or
severe injury or illness.89
Several states have enacted sanctions for failure to comply with the
statutes. In New York, the penalty for noncompliance is revocation
or suspension of a hospital's license. 90 More frequently, criminal
penalties are imposed for refusal to furnish emergency treatment.91
Violations of the statutes would also be grounds for civil liability in
83. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (Deering 1975).
84. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-b (McKinney 1977).
85. Id
86. Id § 2805-b(2).
87. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 / § 86 (Smith-Hurd 1977).
88. TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-5201 (1977).
89. Id
90. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2806 (McKinney 1977).
91. Violations are usually misdemeanors, punishable by fines of up to $1000.
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private actions for damages.92
The commentators agree that these statutes indicate a trend toward
requiring hospitals to maintain emergency departments and to fur-
nish care to those in need.93 The trend, however, is far from univer-
sal. Several of the states that impose duties to maintain emergency
departments exempt private hospitals from the statute's scope.94
Even more states have not enacted statutory obligations at all. Over
fifty years have passed since the first statute requiring a hospital to
treat emergency cases was enacted,95 and only a handful of states
have followed. The trend is not only incomplete, but painstakingly
slow in developing.
V. ALTERNATE RATIONALES
A. Imposition of Other Duties Indicates High Degree of Public
Responsibility
Despite the common law attitude toward nonfeasance, 96 states
have traditionally imposed duties on physicians and hospitals. Per-
haps most well known are statutes requiring a physician or hospital
to report cases of gunshot wounds97 or infectious diseases.9 Of more
interest here, however, are state child abuse reporting statutes. These
statutes impose broad obligations as part of comprehensive state pub-
lic welfare programs.
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws ob-
ligating physicians, hospital administrators, and others to report sus-
pected cases of child abuse to local social welfare agencies.99
E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-5203 (1977); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 4438a(2) (Vernon 1976).
92. See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
93. A SOUTHWICK, supra note 70, at 184; UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH HEALTH
LAW CENTER, supra note 70, at 28; Note, supra note 45, at 1020.
94. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
95. Illinois first enacted its statute in 1927. See supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
96. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
97. Eg., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11160-11161 (Deering 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 28.643 (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25 (McKinney 1980).
98. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-33 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.42 (West
1970); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2101 (McKinney 1980). See generally Frankel,
Criminal Omissions: A Legal Microcosm, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 367, 402-05 (1965).
99. Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present, A Glimpse at the Future: A
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Significantly, the statutes do not differentiate between public and pri-
vate hospitals.l °° Reporting duties are imposed on all physicians or
hospital administrators who suspect a child has been abused or bat-
tered. Many states have also provided criminal penalties for failure
to report suspected cases, but civil liability presents a greater
threat. 101
Two California cases illustrate that the reporting statutes are not
merely empty gestures. In a 1970 civil action'012 brought by a child's
natural father against four hospital-based physicians, the father al-
leged that the doctors had violated the reporting statute. The child
had been taken to the defendants on three occasions with multiple
injuries inflicted by the mother's boyfriend. 3 Although one of the
physicians suspected child abuse, no reports were filed. After three
days of trial, a settlement was reached, whereby the defendants
agreed to pay over $500,000 in damages.1" In a similar civil case, the
California Supreme Court ruled in Landeros v. Flood'0 that a hospi-
tal and attending physicians could be liable for failure to diagnose
and report a case of child abuse. Furthermore, the physician could
be held liable for subsequent damages to the child if such additional
injuries were reasonably foreseeable. 106
In addition to requiring that reports be filed, many child abuse re-
porting statutes have imposed other obligations on physicians and
hospitals. Several states have recognized the importance of a
mandatory medical examination and oblige hospitals and physicians
Critical4nalysis of the Development of Child.Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.-KENT
L. Rav. 641, 650 (1978). For a compilation of the statutes, see Comment, Civil Liabil-
ityfor Failing to Report Child.Abuse, I DET. L. REv. 135, 135-36 (1977).
100. Comment, supra note 99, at 135-36.
101. Fraser, supra note 99, at 665-67; Comment, supra note 99, at 136.
102. Robinson v. Wical, No. 70-37607 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Luis Obispo, filed
Sept. 4, 1970).
103. For a shocking description of the child's injuries, see Ramsey & Lawler, The
Battered Child Syndrome, 1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 372, 374-76 (1974).
104. Comment, supra note 99, at 136-37; TIME, Nov. 20, 1972, at 74.
105. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
106. The court held that the jury should determine whether or not a reasonably
prudent physician would have diagnosed the child as battered. In that sense, the
court addressed the case on a medical malpractice theory. The court also concluded
that the jury should resolve the question of the foreseeability of future abuse. Id at
412, 551 P.2d at 396, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
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to treat battered children. 07 For example, Pennsylvania's statute
provides:
Children appearing to suffer any physical or mental trauma
which may constitute child abuse, shall be admitted to and
treated in appropriate facilities of private and public hospitals
on the basis of medical need and shall not be refused or deprived
in any way of proper medical treatment and care. 1°8
The statute provides for the issuance of a court order compelling
treatment if the hospital refuses to render appropriate care. 10 9 It also
provides a civil action for damages against the hospital." 0 Other
states require hospitals or physicians to render care if requested by
the local social welfare agency or officer, regardless of parental
consent. I I
Recently, many states have amended their reporting statutes to in-
clude provisions for temporary protective custody of the child." 2
These provisions are designed to remove the child from home before
additional injury or abuse is inflicted. The protective custody provi-
sions also recognize that additional medical treatment may be neces-
sary, but that parents may be unwilling to arrange for such care.
Consequently, the statutes authorize hospitals and physicians to keep
a child in custody under certain conditions." 3
107. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(h)2 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAws § 40-11-6(3)
(1977). The Rhode Island provision states that the Department of Social and Reha-
bilitative Services, after receiving a report of child abuse, "shall have the child ex-
amined by a licensed physician." Id
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2209(a) (Purdon 1979).
109. Id § 2209(b).
110. Id
I11. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.248(6) (Callaghan 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:6-8.28 (West 1976).
112. Fraser, supra note 99, at 674.
113. Eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(6) (West 1980). The Florida provision is rep-
resentative of these enactments:
Any person in charge of any hospital or similar institution or any physician
treating a child may keep that child in his custody without consent of the parents,
legal guardian or legal custodian, whether or not additional medical treatment is
required, if the circumstances are such that continuing the child in the child's
place of residence or in the care or custody of the parents, legal guardian, or legal
custodian presents an imminent danger to the child's life or physical or mental
health.
Id Other enactments are nearly identical. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-811 (1977);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-5 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.056 (1980). Other states
empower courts to order a hospital or physician to keep a child in temporary custody.
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The reporting statutes have imposed a variety of obligations on
physicians and hospitals. States have imposed these duties on all
hospitals, regardless of status. The imposition of these duties serves
the public policy objectives of identifying, investigating and treating
child abuse cases." 4 Although the common law frowned upon the
imposition of affirmative obligations to act," 5 it is clear that when
acceptable social policy considerations are served, such duties can
and will be imposed.
The imposition of a duty to treat emergency patients would like-
wise serve desirable social goals. Like child abuse reporting statutes,
state legislation imposing an obligation to treat emergency patients
would serve public policy and humanitarian considerations. The
child abuse reporting statutes, which authorize physicians or hopitals
to keep a child in protective custody," 6 indicate that hospitals and
physicians have a high degree of public responsibility toward the pa-
tients they treat. It is inconsistent with that degree of public responsi-
bility to deny emergency treatment to persons who need it.
B. Physicians and Hospitals are in a Fiduciary
Relationship to the Public
The view that hospitals and physicians are in a fiduciary relation-
ship to the public finds support in several areas of hospital law. The
public accountability of hospitals and physicians has been instrumen-
tal in the law regarding medical staff appointments and privileges." 7
The existence of the trust relationship between hospitals and the pub-
lic provides a basis for imposing a duty to administer emergency
medical care.
The law is settled that a physician does not have an absolute right
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-107 (1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 119,
§ 5Ic (West 1975). The Massachusetts provision empowers judges to "authorize the
hospital and attending physicians ... to keep such a child in the hospital until cus-
tody is transferred" to the Department of Public Welfare. Id
114. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
117. See generaly, Note, Denial of Staff Privileges: Hearing and Judicial Review,
56 IowA L. REv. 1351 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note, Denial ofPrivileges]; Note,
Hospital Medical Staff When are Privilege Denials Judicially Reviewable?, 11 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 95 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Hospital Medical Staff); Note,
The Physician's Right to Hospital Staff Membershfp: The Public-Private Dichotony,
1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 485 [hereinafter cited as Note, Public-Private Dichotony].
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol24/iss1/5
EMERGENCY PATIENTS
to an appointment in either a public or private hospital."' 8 It is also
widely accepted, however, that a public hospital may not act arbitrar-
ily, capriciously, or unreasonably in granting, denying, or restricting
staff privileges. 19 Courts have been willing, therefore, to review
public hospital board actions and decisions. Furthermore, since pub-
lic hospitals are owned by the government, courts have insisted that
such hospitals afford the physician procedural due process in compli-
ance with the fourteenth amendment. 120 Physicians have attacked
public hospital rules or decisions on the grounds that they are unrea-
sonable or arbitrary,'12 or that due process requirements were not
met.' 22 Implicit in decisions reviewing public hospital board action
is the principle that the board holds its power in public trust and may
not contravene the public interest.' 23
118. Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927) (a physician does not have a con-
stitutional right to practice in a public hospital); Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174,46
A.2d 298 (1946) (private hospital has the right to exclude any physician from practic-
ing therein). Accord Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 A.D. 204, 205 N.Y.S.
554, aff'dper curiam, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1924).
119. See Note, Public-Private Dichotomy, supra note 117, at 487-91.
120. A. SOUTHWICK, supra note 70, at 431; Note, Denial of Privileges, supra note
117, at 1354-56. Due process is not violated, however, by the summary suspension of
a physician if the hospital acted to safeguard the welfare of its patients. The physi-
cian need only be afforded the opportunity for a hearing within a reasonable time.
See, e.g., Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (hospital
may summarily restrict physician's privileges when his competence has been called
into question, provided hospital grants him an adjudicatory hearing within a reason-
able time); Duby v. Baron, 369 Mass. 614, 341 N.E.2d 870 (1976) (when the quality of
care rendered by physician has been cast into doubt, summary suspension followed
by prompt hearing does not offend due process).
121. E.g., Ware v. Benedikt, 225 Ark. 185, 280 S.W.2d 234 (1955) (hospital by-law
requinng that staff physicians be members of local medical society ruled invalid).
Accord Hamilton County Hosp. v. Andrews, 227 Ind. 217, 84 N.E.2d 469 (1949), cert.
denied. 338 U.S. 831 (1949). See, e.g., Bronaugh v. City of Parkersburg, 148 W. Va.
568, 136 S.E.2d 783 (1964) (court invalidated a rule stating that before a physician
could be appointed to a public hospital staff he must be on the staff of a private
hospital); Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237
P.2d 737 (hospital by-law excluding physicians who practiced contract medicine held
arbitrary and discriminatory).
122. Eg., Milford v. People's Community Hosp. Auth., 380 Mich. 49, 155 N.W.2d
835 (1968) (hospital board violated due process because suspended physician not
granted hearing): Johnson v. City of Ripon, 259 Wis. 84, 47 N.W.2d 328 (1951) (due
process requires that physician be afforded notice and hearing before revocation of
privileges).
123. The opinions emphasized that the hospital's actions must promote "the
safety, interest and welfare of patients and the general public." Ware v. Benedikt, 225
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Courts traditionally afforded private hospitals a free reign in ad-
ministration and operation.. 4 The actions and procedures of private
hospital boards were not even subject to judicial review and were left
strictly to the discretion of the board. The only constraint on private
hospitals was that they act in accordance with their rules and regula-
tions. 2 5 This view was a product of the philosophy that private cor-
porations should be free to conduct their business without judicial
interference.
Increasingly, however, the trend is to ignore any distinction be-
tween private and public institutions. 2 6 One source of this develop-
ment is the widespread distribution of government funds to hospitals
through the Hill-Burton Act 2 7 or through programs like Medicare
and Medicaid. 128 Several courts have held that the receipt of govern-
mental funds and benefits, such as tax exemptions, may be sufficient
Ark. 185, 189, 280 S.W.2d 234, 236 (1955). Language to the same effect may be found
in Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Hosp., 425 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1970) (motion
for stay granted), afid, 437 F.2d 173, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1971).
124. E.g., Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963)
(private hospital board had the power to appoint and remove staff physicians at will);
Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 144 A.2d 341 (1958) (court is without
authority to interfere in internal affairs of private hospital); Foote v. Community
Hosp., 195 Kan. 385, 405 P.2d 423 (1965) (private hospital board's managerial powers
are discretionary and not subject to judicial review). See generally Note, Denial of
Privileges, supra note 117, at 1356-60; Note, Public Private Dichotomy, supra note 117,
at 492-93.
125. Note, Public-Private Dichotomy, supra note 117, at 492. Thus, if the hospi-
tal's by-laws are silent regarding hearings before dismissal, the board need not afford
the physician a hearing. Eg., Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, 243 Iowa 582, 52 N.W.2d
701 (1952) (no impropriety in hospital's not even giving notice to physician that he
had been dismissed); Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp., 203 Va. 236, 123
S.E.2d 553 (1962) (physician not entitled to hearing before dismissal from private
hospital).
126. See McMahon, Judicial Review of Internal Policy Decisions of Private Non-
profit Hospitals: A Common Law Approach, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 149 (1977); Note,
Judicial Review of Private Hospital Activities, 75 MICH. L. Rnv. 445 (1976).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1976). Pursuant to this Act, the federal government makes
grants for the construction or modernization of hospital facilities. All recipient hospi-
tals are obligated to provide a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay.
Id § 291c(e). See 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(a) (1981). See generally Rose, Federal Regula-
tion of Services to the Poor Under the Hill-Burton Act: Realities and Pit/alls, 70 Nw.
U.L. Rv. 168 (1975).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395, 1396 (1976). For discussions of these provisions, see But-
ler, An Advocate's Guide to the Medicare Program, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 831
(1975); Butler, The Medicaid Program: Current Statutory Requirements and Judicial
Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE Rnv. 7 (1974).
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to imbue a private hospital's operations with state action., 29 The re-
sult of these decisions is to subject an increasing number of private
hospitals to the requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
These decisions represent the minority view, however, and for most
courts, receipt of government funds is only one element in finding
state action.
Of far greater significance is judicial recognition of the proposition
that even private hospitals are vested with a public character. The
New Jersey Supreme Court has been at the forefront of this move-
ment. In Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital,'11 the court held that a pri-
vate hospital 32 had a duty to consider an osteopathic physician's
application for staff privileges, despite its by-laws to the contrary.
133
129. Eg., Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir.
1975) (private hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton funds and participation in Medicare
and Medicaid programs constitutes state action); Pollock v. Methodist Hosp., 392 F.
Supp. 393 (E.D. La. 1975) (private hospital, which receives substantial funds through
Hill-Burton Act, satisfies state action requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Accord Duf-
field v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974); O'Neill v.
Grayson County War Memorial Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973); Don v. Okmul-
gee Memorial Hosp., 443 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1971); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp.
Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323
F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1963).
130. Eg., Madry v. Sorel, 558 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1977) (receipt of Hill-Burton
funds is not sufficient by itself to transform private hospital into arm of the state);
Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir.) (hospital that received Hill-Bur-
ton funds and tax exemptions did not act under color of state law), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 948 (1975); Hodge v. Paoli Memorial Hosp., 433 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(mere receipt of Hill-Burton funds insufficient to establish finding of state action).
Accord Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Medical Center, Inc., 507 F.2d 1103
(9th Cir. 1974). The courts appear to require a connection between the state involve-
ment and the objectionable activity. If the governmental involvement does not aid,
encourage, or demonstrate approval of the activity, the courts refuse to find state in-
volvement. E.g., Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), all'd, 506 F.2d
1395 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally Cronin, Private Hospitals that Receive Public Funds
Under the Hill-Burton Program: The State Action Implications, 12 NEw ENG. L. REv.
525 (1977).
131. 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
132. The court noted that despite the "private" label, the hospital's certificate of
incorporation declared that the purpose of the institution was to care for "sick or
injured persons as the facilities of the hospital permit." Furthermore, the hospital
had solicited funds publicly and was eligible for Hill-Burton grants. Id at 390-91,
192 A.2d at 818-19.
133. Id at 390-91, 192 A.2d at 824-25. In so holding, the court relied on its previ-
ous decision in Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d
791 (1961). In Falcone, the court invalidated a rule prohibiting an osteopath from
membership in a local medical society, as arbitrary and discriminatory.
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The court acknowledged that the hospital's administrators possessed
broad managerial powers. The exercise of those powers was so im-
bedded with the public interest, however, that the hospital officials
were in a fiduciary relationship to both the public and the medical
community. 134 Therefore, the courts could overturn the exercise of
that discretion if the board's actions were unreasonable or unrelated
to the public good.
The Greisman rule is a departure from previous judicial unwilling-
ness to review the actions of a private hospital.135 The court persua-
sively indicated that numerous other activities, whose functions are
less public than hospitals, have been subjected to judicial and legisla-
tive scrutiny. 136 Emphasizing the vital public interests at stake, the
court concluded that private hospitals' actions should not be immune
from judicial review. Several courts have followed Greisman and rec-
ognize the quasi-public nature of private hospitals.' 37 These courts,
therefore, are willing to overturn conduct that contravenes the public
interest. 38
134. 40 N.J. at 403, 192 A.2d at 825. Judge Jacobs, writing for a unanimous court,
noted:
Hospital officials are properly vested with large measures of managing discretion
and to the extent that they exert their efforts toward the elevation of hospital
standards and higher medical care, they will receive broad judicial support. But
they must never lose sight of the fact that the hospitals are operated not for pri-
vate ends, but for the benefit of the public, and that their existence is for the
purpose of faithfully furnishing facilities to the members of the medical profes-
sion in aid of their service to the public. They must recognize that their powers,
particularly those relating to the selection of staff members, are powers in trust
which are always to be dealt with as such.
40 N.J. at 403-04, 192 A.2d at 825.
135. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
136. E.g., railroads, warehouses, insurance rates and the milk industry. 40 N.J. at
397-98, 192 A.2d at 821-22.
137. Eg., Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d
568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962); Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal.
App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974); Hawkins v. Kinsie, 540 P.2d 345 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1975); Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564 (1972);
Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 11 N.H. 276, 281 A.2d 589 (1971); David-
son v. Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ohio App. 2d 246, 250 N.E.2d 892 (1969); Adler
v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n, 453 Pa. 60,311 A.2d 634 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131
(1974); Woodard v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37 (1966).
138. The language of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Hawkins v. Kinsie, 540
P.2d 345, 349 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) is representative:
While the governing board of a private hospital must necessarily have broad
discretion in its decisions relative to renewal of staff privileges for a physi-
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Similarly, a growing number of courts have inquired into the va-
lidity of the procedural process that private hospitals afford staff
members and applicants. Originally, courts deferred to the discretion
of private hospitals in staff related matters, even if no procedural
safeguards were provided.'39 Following Greisman, the New Jersey
Superior Court held that a private hospital could not refuse an appli-
cant for staff privileges without giving him a fair hearing. 4 ' The
court concluded that an inquiry of this sort was mandated by the
hospital's fiduciary duty to serve the interests of the public and the
individual applicant. 14' Other courts have followed New Jersey's
lead and require private hospitals to grant physicians due process of
law when considering applications for appointment or renewal.' 42
Another New Jersey decision has upheld the right of a physician to
have an attorney represent him at medical staff hearings and also per-
mitted broad discovery of documents in the board's possession.'
43
Courts have extended the rationale that a private hospital's board
members are fiduciaries with an obligation to the public beyond the
cian .... this discretion must not be immune from judicial review .... There-
fore, a physician whose staff privileges are not renewed by the governing board
of a private hospital operated to serve the general public states a claim for relief
in damages by alleging that the decision not to renew those privileges was arbi-
trary, capricious, and unreasonable.
139. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
140. Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. Super. 418, 231 A.2d 389 (1967).
141. Id at 424, 231 A.2d at 538.
142. E.g., Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114
Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974) (private hospital may not deprive physician of staff privileges
without granting due process); Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 497
P.2d 564 (1972) (applicant for staff privileges at a private hospital is entitled to a
hearing and procedural due process); Hagan v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp., 102 R.I. 717,
232 A.2d 596 (1967) (court reviewed procedures afforded by private hospital and
found them in compliance with due process).
These courts view procedural fairness as an essential check on the fiduciary power
of hospital boards. Due process requirements are a means of assuring that each appli-
cation will be afforded individual review and attention. The interests of the hospital
board in maintaining a quality staff, the individual applicant in pursuing his profes-
sion, and the public in having access to capable physicians are all served by these
processes. See Note, Hospital Medical Staff, supra note 117, at 109.
Contra Monyek v. Parkway Gen. Hosp., 273 So. 2d 430 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(private hospital could deny physician staff membership without hearing and without
assigning reasons for denial); Jain v. Northwest Community Hosp., 67 Ill. App. 3d
911, 385 N.E.2d 108 (1978) (actions of private hospital not judicially reviewable). See
supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
143. Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp., 79 N.J. 549, 401 A.2d 533 (1979).
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area of staff privileges. For example, courts have generally invali-
dated exculpatory provisions in contracts between hospitals and pa-
tients.' 44 In Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California,145 a
contract between a patient and a private hospital releasing the hospi-
tal from liability for negligence was held to violate the public interest.
The court emphasized that the private hospital's conduct was affected
with the public interest and that exemption from liability was inimi-
cal to that interest. 146 Courts have also applied the Tunkl rationale to
exculpatory contracts between individual physicians and their pa-
tients, with uniform results.47
In Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Association,'n the New Jersey
Supreme Court utilized the public trust doctrine in holding that a
private hospital could not refuse its facilities to women seeking elec-
tive abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy. The court
stressed that, as fiduciaries, the hospital's directors had committed
themselves to serving the public without discrimination.' 49 Finding
no valid reason for permitting therapeutic, but not elective abortions,
the court concluded that the hospital's policy was arbitrary and unre-
lated to valid hospital purposes. Although some courts have rejected
this holding, 150 the rationale is likely to be followed elsewhere to ex-
pand access to medical services.' 15
144. UNIVERSITY OF PITrSBURGH HEALTH LAW CENTER, HOSPITAL LAW MAN-
UAL, PRINCIPLES OF HOSPITAL LIABILITY 71 (1981); M. Bertolet & L. Goldsmith,
supra note 8, at 687.
145. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
146. Id at 101-04, 383 P.2d at 447-49, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 38-41.
147. Belshaw v. Feinstein, 258 Cal. App. 2d 711, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1968); Bow-
man v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d
429 (Tenn. 1977).
148. 71 N.J. 478, 366 A.2d 641 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
149. The court relied heavily on Greisman, as in the following passage:
As quasi-public institutions, their actions must not contravene the public interest.
They must serve the public without discrimination. Their boards of directors are
managing quasi-public trusts and each has a fiduciary relationship with the
public.
Id. at 487, 366 A.2d at 645.
150. E.g., Jones v. Eastern Maine Medical Center, 448 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Me.
1978) (private hospital may legally withhold the use of its facilities to perform elective
second trimester abortions); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 374 F. Supp.
227 (E.D. Tex. 1974), afl'd, 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.) (private hospital may bar all non-
therapeutic abortions), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975).
151. See McMahon, Judicial Review of Internal Policy Decisions of Private Non-
profit Hospitals: A Common LawApproach, 3 Am. J.L. & MED. 149, 167 (1977); Price,
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The principle that a hospital's board is in a fiduciary relationship
to the public should guide our analysis of emergency medical care. It
would be consistent with that fiduciary relationship to impose an ob-
ligation on private hospitals to render emergency care within the
common law framework.'52 Private hospitals, like railroads, inns,
and common carriers, are affected with the public interest. It is a
judicial anomaly that patrons of an inn or owners of bailed goods are
afforded greater protection than patients of a hospital. The inn-
keeper's performance is hardly more vital to the public than that of
the hospital. The dynamism of the common law' 53 should respond to
this anomaly by imposing a duty to treat emergency patients upon all
hospitals.
It is troubling that the common law regarding a hospital's duty to
render emergency aid dates to the 1930's.1'54 The entire medical field
has progressed since then and social attitudes have also changed.'55
Expanding the Public Obligation of Private Hospitals, I 1 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 119
(1977).
152. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
153. Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote over 20
years ago:
One of the great virtues of the common law is its dynamic nature that makes it
adaptable to the requirements of society at the time of its application in court.
There is not a rule of the common law in force today that has not evolved from
some earlier rule of common law, gradually in some instances, more suddenly in
others, leaving the common law of today when compared with the common law
of centuries ago as different a day is from night. The nature of the common law
requires that each time a rule of law is applied it be carefully scrutinized to make
sure that the conditions and needs of the times have not so changed as to make
further application of it the instrument of injustice.
State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (1957).
154. Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews was decided in 1934. See supra notes 24-
28 and accompanying text.
155. For a brief overview of the changes in the medical profession, see J.
KNOWLES, supra note 2, at ch. 1.
The changing social attitudes toward medical care are demonstrated by the number
of commentators suggesting that health care is a right. E.g., E. KENNEDY, supra note
4, at 17. Kennedy's book, a compilation of hearings before the Senate Health Sub-
committee, is a plea for a federal health security program. Kennedy insists that "good
health care should be a right for all Americans." Id Victor Fuchs, another right to
health advocate, equates access to health care with access to education. V. FUCHS,
WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE 28 (1974). He posits:
The assertion that medical care is (or should be) a "right" is more plausible.
In a sense medical care is to health what schooling is to wisdom. No society can
truthfully promise to make everyone wise, but society can make schooling freely
available; it can even make it compulsory.
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The common law rule emerged at a time when individual medical
practitioners were the norm, rather than the exception. Today, mem-
bership on a hospital staff is crucial to the great majority of American
physicians.'56 The hospital is now the major health care resource in
most communities and the emergency room is the focal point for
health care delivery. 157 The common law should adjust to these con-
ditions in order to meet today's needs.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is shocking that although our country possesses highly sophisti-
cated health care facilities and manpower, those resources are not
necessarily available to emergency patients. The imposition of a duty
on all hospitals that maintain emergency rooms to render emergency
care is compatible with the high degree of public responsibility asso-
ciated with hospitals and is consistent with developments in other ar-
eas of hospital law. Before Americans lose confidence in our system
of justice,'58 the law must respond by imposing a duty to treat emer-
gency patients. A legal system that permits hospitals to close their
Id
Fuchs also criticizes existing hospital practices. He is especially critical of unneces-
sary hospital utilization and unduly long stays. He suggests that more efficient ad-
ministration and decentralization of health care delivery will improve access to
medical care. Id at 149-51.
Victor and Ruth Sidel contend that health care is a fundamental right, and urge a
decentralized, community controlled delivery system. V. SIDEL & R. SIDEL, A
HEALTHY STATE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CRISIS IN UNITED
STATES MEDICAL CARE (1977). See generally E. BANDMAN, BIOETHICS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1978); T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5; OATMAN, MEDICAL CARE IN THE
UNITED STATES 124-32 (1978); Blackstone, On Health Care as a Legal Right: An Ex-
ploration ofLegal and Moral Grounds, 10 GA. L. REV. 391 (1976).
156. Hirsh, Health Care as a Business, in LEGAL MEDICINE ANNUAL-1980 at 275
(C. Wecht ed.); A. SOUTHWICK, supra note 70, at 429. See also Comment, Hospital
Medical Staff Privileges: Recent Developments in Procedural Due Process Require-
ments, 12 WILLAMETrE L.J. 137 (1975).
157. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, EMERGENCY SERVICES 7-8 (1972). See
supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
158. Charles Bohlen wrote the following timeless words in 1908:
[It] should not be forgotten that a system ofjustice which lags too far behind the
universally received conceptions of abstract justice, in the end must lose the sym-
pathy, the confidence, perhaps even the respect of the community.
Bohlen, Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 316,
337 (1908).
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doors to emergency victims is barbaric, morally reprehensible, and
unworthy of respect.
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